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ABSTRACT. In this essay, I advance a reading of Phi losophi ca l  Crumbs or  a  Crumb o f  
Phi lo sophy , published by Søren Kierkegaard under the pseudonym Johannes Climacus. I argue 
that this book is animated by a poetics of self-incrimination. Climacus keeps accusing himself of 
having stolen his words from someone else. In this way, he deliberately adopts the identity of a 
thief as an incognito. To understand this poetics of self-incrimination, I analyze the hypothetical 
thought-project that Climacus develops in an attempt to show what it means to go  fur ther  than  
Socrates. In my reading, I distinguish between a Socratic and a non-Socratic conception of 
education, both of which rely on an incognito. Socrates takes on the maieutic incognito of an 
ignorant bystander in order to force his interlocutors to turn inward so that the truth that is 
already within them can be born. In contrast, the non-Socratic education that Climacus advances 
as a hypothesis relies on what I call ‘the incognito as a true form’. It is an incognito insofar as it 
confronts the pupils with a paradox on which the understanding runs aground. It is a true form 
insofar as its immediate appearance is not a disguise, but a true form. This indirect mode of 
communication is necessary, without it pupils will not be able to encounter a truth that is not 
inherent within them. Climacus’ poetics of self-incrimination, I argue, tries to repeat this indirect 
mode of communication by adopting the incognito of a thief as a true form. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Søren Kierkegaard’s Philosophiske Smuler eller En Smule Philosophi (Philosophical Crumbs or a Crumb of 
Philosophy) was published in 1844 under the pseudonym Johannes Climacus.1 As the connective 
‘or’ (eller) already suggests, the book has no singular form, but can be interpreted either as 
multiple philosophical crumbs or as a single crumb of philosophy.2 This announces a tension between 
the outer forms in which the book manifest itself (the philosophical crumbs) and the inner 
existential insight that is expressed in this way (the crumb of philosophy). Apparently the plural 
manifestation is the only mode in which the singular existential insight can emerge. It cannot be 
stated directly, but can only unroll itself in contrastive forms that preserve its innerness through 
tensions and contradictions that still need to be resolved by the reader. In this essay, I show that 
these indirect and contrastive forms are animated by a poetics of self-incrimination. By adopting 
the identity of a thief as an incognito, I argue, the pseudonymous author Johannes Climacus tries 
to recharge the absolute paradox that he invents/discovers at the heart of Christianity.  
 
Self-incrimination  
Climacus’ poetics of self-incrimination is already announced in the motto of the book: ‘Better 
well hanged than ill wed’ (PF, 3/SKS 4, 214). This echo of the reckless and provocative words of 
Feste, the jester from Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night, sets the tone for the entire book (2003: 70).3 It 
indicates that Climacus would rather be seen as a criminal (and face the consequences) than join 
speculative scholarship in its attempts to mediate the offensive nature of Christianity and make it 
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respectable as part of a progressive moment in the development of the Hegelian system. In line 
with the motto, Climacus deliberately provides the reader with a series of self-incriminating 
statements. 
At crucial moments in Philosophical Crumbs, Climacus interrupts his own argument by 
introducing an imaginary opponent who accuses him of stealing his words from someone else. 
These accusations do not come from outside, but are an integral part of Climacus’ own dialogic 
discourse. They usually begin with a phrase like ‘perhaps someone will say’ or ‘if someone were 
to say,’ followed by an accusation of theft or plagiarism. This practice of self-incrimination 
becomes a signature mark for the whole book. By adopting the incognito of a common thief, 
Climacus puts his own authority in question and dialogizes his own project. At the same time, he 
bolsters his project by suggesting that he did not steal his ideas from just anybody, but that they 
originated with ‘the god’ (guden). Moreover, he suggest that theft is the condition for getting 
access to these ideas, regardless of whether we use them for an attack or for a defense of 
Christianity. Theft evokes ‘sin’ and ‘guilt,’ and the kind of education Climacus advances (as a 
hypothetical project) can only commence by accepting these incriminations.  
Quite a few interpreters (Evans 1992; Fenves 1993; Mulhall 1999; Hale 2002; Conway 
2004; Pons 2004; Howland 2006; Muench 2006) have highlighted the role of the imaginary 
opponent and his accusations of theft and plagiarism. I want to push this point a bit by arguing 
that it is ultimately Climacus himself who is the source of the accusations that are brought 
against him. By interrupting his own discourse with dialogical accusations, Climacus invites his 
readers to join in the ambiguous self-incrimination that he is enacting. In this way, I argue, he 
deliberately adopts the identity of a thief as an incognito. The aim of this is to re-activate the 
offensive nature of Christianity, demanding a gesture of self-incrimination as a response, in order 
to force his readers to take a stance. 
If we look at the composition of Philosophical Crumbs, it is constructed as a comedy with 
five acts, preceded by a preface, cut in two by an interlude, and concluded with a moral. This 
comedy employs several variations on Climacus’ incognito of the thief. In chapter 1, Climacus 
develops a thought-project that, by way of hypothesis, investigates what it means to really ‘go 
further’ than Socrates.4 In the process, he accidentally invents a shadow version of Christianity. 
Here Climacus adopts the incognito of the thief by presenting himself as a project maker who 
advances a false claim to an invention that ultimately belongs to no one else than the god. 
Chapter 2 is composed as a poetical venture, the authorship of which is not clearly assigned but 
keeps shifting. Climacus, as the disputed writer of this poetical venture, appears in the incognito 
of a plagiarizer who ends up stealing his words from the god himself. In chapter 3, Climacus 
takes on the incognito of a capricious fellow who introduces a seemingly ludicrous and 
completely unreasonable conception that deliberately aims for the collapse of the understanding. 
In the appendix to this chapter, the incognito of the thief gets a new twist when Climacus admits 
that he has only been parroting the paradox. In chapter 4 and 5, the poetical venture is taken up 
again but the accusatory mode of speaking of the imaginary opponent is now mixed with a 
laudatory mode of speaking. In this way, it simultaneously enacts the dismissive logic of an attack 
and the jubilant logic of a defense, both of which turn out to be equally problematic. In addition 
to the five chapters, Climacus inserts an interlude that addresses the difficult issue of coming 
into existence. This interlude plays with the contrast between the ordinary function of the 
interlude (shorten time by filling it up with a diversion) and the way it is used here (prolonging 
time by discussing the most complicated concepts of the whole book).  
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THE MAIEUTIC INCOGNITO 
The first chapter of Philosophical Crumbs is announced under the title ‘Thought-Project.’ Climacus 
argues that the speculative scholarship of his day, despite its attempt at ‘going further’ than 
Socrates, ultimately comes down to re-affirming the Socratic conception of recollection. ‘All 
these ideas are that Greek idea of recollection, although this is not always noticed, because they 
have been arrived at by going further [gaae videre].’ (PF, 10, note */SKS 4, 219) In this way, he 
identifies speculative scholarship with the Socratic position it supposedly had moved beyond. 
Climacus presents his thought-project as an experiment in which he will explicate, by way of a 
hypothesis, what it would mean to really go further than Socrates. It is not easy to summarize 
this hypothesis, but it goes something like this: if there is a philosophical position that moves 
beyond Socrates, it must involve a different conception of truth. Socratically speaking, all people 
have access to the truth through recollection; the condition for reaching this truth is already 
present within themselves. Going further than Socrates means that this is no longer the case. 
Instead, the access to the truth is blocked and the condition for reaching it needs to come from 
somewhere else.  
Despite its attempt at going further, Climacus’ thought-project overlaps on one 
important point with the Socratic dialogue: the need for an indirect form of communication. 
This can be achieved by adopting an incognito (see e.g. Boven 2014, 2018; Muench 2006). In this 
way, both Climacus and Socrates can ensure that their recipients start to question their own 
position and turn inwards, rather than simply copying the ideas of an external authority. The 
term ‘maieutic’ is derived from Plato’s Theaetetus, in which Socrates compares himself to a 
midwife (maia) (1921, 34-5/150c). Like a midwife, Socrates can only assist others in giving birth, 
but remains barren of wisdom (agonos sophias) himself (Ibid.). Climacus believes that, humanly 
speaking, assisting others is the highest goal one can achieve with education. As he states, 
‘between one human being and another maieuesthai [serving as a midwife] is the highest; giving 
birth [føde] indeed belongs to the god’ (PF, 11/SKS 4, 220; translation modified).5 In Climacus’ 
estimation, going further than Socrates means substituting the Socratic conception of 
recollection (Erindring) with a conception of rebirth (Gjenfødelse). This constitutes a shift from the 
Socratic position of a midwife (who assists others to give birth) to the position of a divine 
creator (who literally gives birth to others). Climacus, as a human being who addresses himself to 
other human beings, cannot really go further than Socrates and has to stick to a maieutic 
incognito.  
Although Socrates and Climacus use the maieutic incognito for different reasons, its 
underlying structure is more or less the same. Let us first look at the role of the maieutic 
incognito in the Socratic dialogues. Given the prominent role Plato’s Meno plays in Philosophical 
Crumbs, we will take this dialogue as an example. At the start of the dialogue, Socrates adopts the 
incognito of an ignorant bystander who is willing to accept Meno as his master. Initially Meno is 
happy to take on this role. He presents himself as an authority on the question “what is virtue?” 
and invokes other authority figures like Gorgias in the process. Socrates, on the other hand, 
presents himself as someone who has no authority to speak about virtue and openly questions 
authority figures that claim to know all about it.6 By adopting the incognito of an ignorant 
bystander who only asks a few innocent questions, Socrates forces Meno to admit that he does 
not know what virtue is and that the issue is in fact perplexing him. In the course of the 
argument, Socrates complicates the opposition between mastery and slavery on which Meno’s 
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initial definition of virtue is based.7 This comes to a climax in the famous episode in which 
Socrates questions one of Meno’s slaves about geometry. By putting the slave in a position 
where he—like his master Meno—thinks that he can ‘easily make many fine speeches to large 
audiences,’ Socrates ironically identifies the master with his slave (Plato 1997: 883–4/84c).8 
Moreover, he shows that, upon questioning, the slave—unlike his master Meno—is willing to 
admit that he is at a loss and that his previous claim of authority was utterly mistaken. In other 
words, in a few simple steps the slave has already surpassed his master in dialectical reasoning. 
The slave episode is not only an effective mockery of Meno’s assumed authority and mastery; it 
also provides a blueprint for the kind of education that Socrates is propagating.  
This kind of education proceeds in two steps. First, by adopting the incognito of the 
ignorant bystander, Socrates provokes his interlocutor—Meno or his slave—to formulate 
whatever he thinks he knows about the subject in order to let him run aground on a series of 
contradictions and difficulties.9 The aim of this is to make an all too confident interlocutor 
perplexed, ‘numbing him as the numbfish does’ and to expose the one-sided nature of his 
assumptions (Plato 1997: 883/84b, translation modified). In this way, interlocutors become 
aware that they do not really know what they thought they knew. Instead of relying on 
assumptions and authorities, they are turned inward and start to long for the truth that is already 
within them. As a second step, Socrates will remind them of this truth, encourage them to 
discover it, and let them bring it to light. To determine whether they really gave birth to the truth 
and not to some kind of phantom, he will subsequently subject their offspring to all possible 
tests.  
From Climacus’ perspective, leaving the Socratic viewpoint means that human beings 
can no longer be defined as having the truth already within them. Instead, they now have to be 
‘defined as being outside the truth’ (PF, 13/SKS 4, 222). As seen from this new perspective, 
education still proceeds in two steps. The first step still consists of making pupils aware by 
turning them inwards. However, it can no longer be understood as a progressive movement that 
brings the pupils closer to the truth within themselves. On the contrary, this first step rather 
generates a regressive movement that only shows pupils that they are ‘not coming toward 
[kommende til]’ the truth, but are rather ‘going away from [gaaende fra]’ it (Ibid.). Rather than being 
reminded of the truth within themselves (the Socratic viewpoint), pupils are turned inward by 
letting them discover that they are outside of the truth; as such, they are confronted with their 
own untruth. This state of untruth cannot be communicated directly, but can only be revealed 
indirectly. Climacus formulates this as follows: ‘I can discover my own untruth only by myself, 
because only when I discover it is it discovered, not before, even though the whole world knew 
it’ (PF, 14/SKS 4, 223). 
Despite the difference in outcome, the thought-project achieves its effects in a similar 
way as the Socratic dialogue. In both cases, the first step of education can only be attained by 
provoking the pupil to turn inward with the help of an indirect form of communication that 
relies on adopting an incognito. Here ‘the teacher is only an occasion, whoever he may be, even 
if he is a god’ (Ibid.). Climacus tries to achieve this effect by presenting himself as a project 
maker who advances a false claim to an invention that ultimately belongs to no one else but the 
god. The aim of his ambiguous discourse is to set the first step of education in motion. This 
prepares the way for the second step, which constitutes a rebirth through which the pupil first 
receives the condition for discovering the truth. Climacus cannot make this second step happen; 
it is the prerogative of the god.  
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AN INVENTION WITHOUT AN INVENTOR  
At the end of the first chapter, Climacus explicitly hints at his own incognito of a thief. First he 
claims ownership of his project: ‘Look, this is my project [Projekt]!’ (PF, 21/SKS 4, 229; 
translation modified). The next moment, however, an imaginary opponent interrupts his 
discourse, arguing that this project does not in fact belong to Climacus. ‘This is the most 
ludicrous of all projects [Projekter], or, rather, you are the most ludicrous of all project makers 
[Projektmagere], for even if someone projects [projekterer] something foolish, at least the truth 
remains that he was the one who projected [projekteret] it’ (PF, 21/SKS 4, 229; translation 
modified). At issue is not so much the content of the project, but the assumption that Climacus 
is the one who projects it. The opponent reproaches Climacus for ‘behaving like a scoundrel 
who charges a fee for showing an area that everyone can see,’ someone ‘who in the afternoon 
exhibited a ram for a fee, although in the morning anyone could have seen it free of charge, 
grazing in the open pasture’ (Ibid., translation modified). In other words, Climacus is accused of 
taking credit for something that is not at all his own invention. 
In his response to these self-incriminating accusations, Climacus complicates matters 
further by taking two further possibilities into consideration. First he suggests that the invention 
of his project might be similar to the invention of gunpowder. ‘Admittedly, gunpowder was 
invented centuries ago; so it would be ludicrous of me to pretend that I had invented it. But 
would it also be ludicrous for me to assume that someone had invented it?’ (PF, 21/SKS 4, 229–
30). In that case, Climacus would be guilty of stealing intellectual property. However, if we take 
into account what has been invented (e.g. a certain conception of nonexistence that precedes 
rebirth), it is more likely that nobody invented it. ‘Is it not odd that something like this exists, of 
which everyone who knows about it also knows that he did not invent it, and that this “Go to 
the next house” does not stop and cannot be stopped, even if one would go to every human 
being?’ (PF, 22/SKS 4, 230; translation modified). 
Climacus keeps changing roles. At first he appeared as the inventor of his own project, 
then as someone who has stolen it from another human inventor, and finally his project turns 
out to be invented by nobody at all, at least not by a human being. This last option—the 
invention without a human inventor—fascinates Climacus greatly, ‘for it tests the correctness of 
the hypothesis and demonstrates it’ (Ibid.). Here we see that Climacus sees the incognito of a 
thief as an essential part of his argument. It even provides proof for his hypothetical thought-
project. Why is this so? It is not easy to answer this question, as it is part of a complicated play 
that involves the book as a whole. Nonetheless, a first answer can already be given by reflecting 
on the second step of education: the rebirth of the pupil.  
In Climacus’ view, the conception of a rebirth implies a preceding state of nonexistence 
in which the pupil is defined by untruth and has no way of getting access to the truth. ‘It would 
indeed be preposterous to expect that a human being can discover all by himself that he does not 
exist [ikke var til]. But this is the transition inherent to rebirth: from “not existing [ikke at være til]” 
to “existing [at være til]”’ (Ibid.; translation modified). It is for this reason that rebirth—which, 
following the hypothetical logic of the thought-project, is implied by going further than 
Socrates—can only be understood as an invention without a human inventor. It is not possible 
to discover one’s own nonexistence and invent a way out of it. However, as we saw, pupils still 
have to become aware of their own untruth. If someone else does it for them, they do not learn 
anything new and there will be no transition from untruth to truth. According to Climacus, this 
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transition is tied to what he calls ‘the blink of an eye (Øieblik),’ an ordinary Danish word which 
simply refers to a very short time-span, an instant. It is within the blink of an eye that the pupil is 
turned inward and confronted with his or her own untruth. Whether this confrontation results in 
a rebirth is determined by how the pupil decides to react to this confrontation. The offended 
pupil is pushed away by the confrontation; the pupil who has faith makes the transition from 
untruth to truth.  
To get a better sense of how this confrontation with untruth takes place, Climacus has to 
get a sense of the incognito of the god. In contrast to Socrates, who relied on a maieutic incognito, 
the god adopts the incognito as a true form. This incognito is necessary to ensure that the first step 
of education (turning the pupil inward) takes place. In addition, it also provides the condition for 
the second step (generating a rebirth), regardless of whether this second step takes place or not. 
The incognito as a true form is a bit of a counter-intuitive notion. The second part (as a true form) 
immediately seems to cancel the first (incognito). This can be clarified with the help of two 
important notions that are introduced by Climacus: ‘the form of a servant’ and ‘the absolute 
paradox.’ Together they constitute the incognito as a true form. As Climacus makes clear, the 
god appears in the form of a servant. To the extent that the god really becomes a servant, this 
appearance is his true form. At the same time, this appearance is also more than that: it is an 
incognito that confronts the individual with an absolute paradox.  
 
THE FORM OF A SERVANT 
In chapter 2, the hypothetical thought-project is continued in the form of a ‘poetical venture 
[digterisk Forsøg]’ (PF, 23/SKS 4, 230) which spreads out over the whole book and is taken up 
again several times. Echoing the invention without an inventor, this poetical venture will result in 
a poem without a poet. It is for this reason that the authorship of the poetical venture is not 
clearly assigned, but keeps shifting. In his attempts to grasp the idea of the incognito as a true 
form, Climacus identifies himself with two types of poets: the mythological and the religious 
poet. He speaks in the voice of these poets while simultaneously indicating the limits of what 
they can say. Moreover, at the end of the chapter, Climacus is exposed as a plagiarizer who ends 
up stealing his words from the god himself. This reveals a third type of poet: the god. This 
extended play with the attribution of authorship, which evokes a variety of different voices only 
to immediately question them, is an integral part of what I have called Climacus’ poetics of self-
incrimination.  
Throughout the chapter, Climacus tries to understand the incognito as a true form that is 
adopted by the god. He cannot address this incognito right away, but can only get a closer 
understanding of it with the help of an analogy. ‘Suppose there was a king who loved an ordinary 
girl,’ he writes. Only to immediately interrupt his own discourse with a possible objection: ‘—but 
the reader may already have lost patience with this beginning as it sounds like a mythological 
adventure [Eventyr] that is by no means systematic’ (PF, 26/SKS 4, 233; translation modified). 
Climacus believes, however, that he should be forgiven for the transgression of telling a 
mythological adventure. He is, after all, ‘only a poet [kun en Digter] who, mindful of Themistocles’ 
beautiful expression, wants to unroll the tapestry of speech [Talens Tæppe] lest the work on it be 
concealed by being rolled up’ (Ibid.). This reference to Themistocles indicates that Climacus 
cannot stick to the systematic vocabulary of the scholarly treatise, but needs to employ the fuller 
language of mythological poetry to push the boundaries of human language to the limit. Only in 
this way, can he express the ‘kingly concern [kongelige Sorg]’ that is ‘found only in a kingly soul’ 
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and which ‘many human languages do not name at all’ (PF, 28/SKS 4, 235; translation 
modified). 
In Climacus construction of the story about the king, this concern can take on three 
different forms. First, the king fears that the ordinary girl will not be able to forget the difference 
in station between her and the king, which might overpower her to such an extent that there is 
little room left for her to develop her own position. Second, in addition there might be an 
intellectual difference that separates the ordinary girl from the king, making a mutual 
understanding between them impossible.10 Third, even if the king would raise the station of the 
ordinary girl by dressing her up and letting her forget the differences between them, the 
misunderstanding between them would not disappear; it would only remain hidden from her. 
Although Climacus does not unequivocally state how the king can overcome these concerns, it is 
clear from the text that it is brought about by a descent. The king could, for instance, adopt the 
incognito of an ordinary man. This would avoid overpowering the ordinary girl and will ensure 
that she can determine her own relationship to him with frankness and confidence. For 
Climacus, the concern of the king provides an imperfect analogy for the concern of the divine 
teacher. In his view, ‘human language as a whole is so self-centered that is has no intimation of 
such a concern’ (PF, 28/SKS 4, 235; translation modified). Hence, it falls within the realm of the 
ineffable and can only be understood by analogy with the story of the king.  
‘Thus the task [Opgaven] is assigned,’ Climacus states, ‘and we invite the poet [Digteren]’ 
(Ibid.). Climacus has already presented himself as a mythological poet earlier. Despite this self-
proclaimed role he now feels the need to extend an invitation to a second, religious poet that can 
address the situation of the god. Climacus does not indicate whether the invitation is accepted by 
anybody. As a result, the discourse of this religious poet has no clear signature. It is only marked 
by the invitation preceding it (‘we invite the poet’) and by a concluding observation (‘Thus 
speaks the poet,’ PF, 34/SKS 4, 240). This enables Climacus to approach the realm of the 
ineffable in a particular way. On the one hand, he advances a position; on the other, he 
immediately distances himself from it. Let us first look at the position that is taken. The task of 
the religious poet is ‘to find a solution, a point of unity where there is in truth love’s 
understanding, where the god’s concern has overcome its pain’ (PF, 28/SKS 4, 235). In order to 
find this point of unity, the god—like the king—has to become the equal of the pupil through a 
descending movement. 
 
He will appear, therefore, as the equal of the most insignificant person [den Ringeste]. But the most 
insignificant person is the one who serves [tjene] others—consequently, the god will appear in the 
form of a servant [Tjenerens Skikkelse]. But this form of a servant [Tjenerens Skikkelse] is not 
something put on like the king’s “cloak of insignificance [Ringheds-Kappe],” which just by flapping 
open would betray the king […]—but it is his true form [sande Skikkelse]. (PF, 31-2/SKS 4, 238; 
translation modified)  
 
In Climacus’ view, the god adopts the incognito of a servant, but this incognito is not something 
that he takes on (as in the case of the king), it becomes his true form. Strictly speaking it is no 
longer an incognito. The god truly becomes the most insignificant person, the servant. Like the 
maieutic incognito, the incognito as a true form aims to turn the pupil inward (the first step of 
education). Unlike the maieutic incognito, however, it also aims to generate a rebirth (the second 
step).  
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Moving forward, Climacus deliberately creates confusion about the implications of all 
this. Still speaking in the voice of the religious poet, he suggests that the god does everything in 
his power to ensure that nobody gets offended. ‘He is the god, and yet he walks more 
circumspectly than if angels were carrying him—not to avoid striking [stødes] his foot, but so that 
nobody will be trampled into the dust because of being offended at [forarges paa] him.’ (PF, 
32/SKS 4, 238; translation modified). Moments later, however, he distances himself from this 
position. ‘Thus speaks the poet—for how could it occur to him that the god would reveal 
himself [aabenbare sig] in this way in order to bring about the most terrifying decision?’ (PF, 
34/SKS 4, 240; translation modified). It is easy to overlook this self-refutation and to take the 
discourse of the religious poet as the final word on the self-revelation of the god. However, once 
it is noticed and taken seriously, it becomes increasingly clear that the religious poet leaves out an 
important part of the story: the offensive nature of the god’s incognito as a true form. As will 
become clear below, it is only by becoming offensive that the god can make the recipient turn 
inward in order to provoke a decision that might or might not result in a rebirth. 
The religious poet has introduced the notion ‘form of a servant,’ but to fully understand 
the implications of this a third poet needs to be brought in: the god himself. To this end, 
Climacus again interrupts his own discourse to make room for an imaginary opponent who 
accuses him of plagiarism. ‘Now if someone were to say, “What you are composing [digter] is the 
crudest plagiarism [lumpneste Plagiat] ever to appear, since it is nothing more or less than what any 
child knows,” well then I will have to hear with shame that I am a liar’ (PF, 35/SKS 4, 241; 
translation modified). Climacus does not deny the charge of plagiarism, but he takes issue with 
the further specification that it is the crudest plagiarism. ‘After all, every poet who steals, steals 
from another poet, and thus we are all equally crude; indeed, my stealing is perhaps less harmful 
since it is more easily discovered’ (Ibid.; translation modified). If this is the kind of plagiarism the 
imaginary opponent hints at, there is hardly any reason to single Climacus out as the crudest 
plagiarist. Maybe, Climacus suggests, the opponent tries to say that the poem was not stolen 
from another poet? Maybe it has a similar status as a proverb that does not belong to any one 
poet, but seems to be composed by humanity as a whole? In that case, the accusation would not 
so much concern the plagiarism itself, but the arrogance with which Climacus spoke by 
pretending to embody the human race as such. This explanation is dismissed as well. In a sense, 
each human being is equally close to having composed a proverb as all the others. So again there 
is no reason to single Climacus out as the crudest plagiarist. A final explanation follows:  
 
You called my conduct the crudest plagiarism, because I did not steal from any single man, did 
not rob the human race, but robbed the deity or, so to speak, kidnapped him and, although I am 
only a single human being—indeed, even a crude thief—blasphemously pretended to be the god. 
(PF, 35-6/SKS 46, 241; translation modified) 
 
The accusation of plagiarism has entered radical new territory here and is supplemented by the 
accusation of kidnapping, blasphemy and megalomania. At this point, Climacus turns the 
accusation on its head. It is true that Climacus would not be able to write the poem, it is true that 
he has stolen his words from someone else. It is exactly for this reason that Climacus has been 
so ambiguous about his own authorship. He has built up his text in such a way that the reader 
can only conclude that he is a plagiarist. This conclusion prepares the way for his argument that, 
ultimately, only the god could have written this poem. After all, it is very well possible that 
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human beings imagine themselves to be like the god or that they imagine the god to be like 
them. However, it is much harder to conceive that ‘the god poetized [digtede] himself in the 
likeness of a human being’ (PF, 36/SKS 4, 242). This idea, Climacus suggests, is so absurd that it 
could not have arisen in a human heart, but must have originated somewhere else. As such, it is 
an offense to the understanding. This brings us to the second aspect of the incognito as a true 
form: the absolute paradox. 
 
THE ABSOLUTE PARADOX 
Usually a paradox is understood as an apparent contradiction that despite its counter-intuitive 
appearance is nonetheless true. Such an apparent contradiction already includes its own 
resolution. As Climacus suggests, this is not the case with an absolute paradox. The 
contradiction is real and cannot be resolved, even though it still expresses the truth. Given the 
absolute nature of the paradox it is hard to say anything about it, without immediately 
contradicting oneself. As the title of chapter 3—‘The absolute paradox (a metaphysical caprice 
[Grille])’—already announces, Climacus will address this difficulty by juxtaposing two seemingly 
incommensurable modes: the absolute and the capricious. Later on, the imaginary opponent 
highlights this point even more: ‘You are such a capricious fellow [Grillefænger], I am on to you, 
there is no way you believe that it would occur to me to be concerned about such a caprice 
[Grille], something so bizarre or so ludicrous that it doubtless has not yet occurred to anyone 
and, above all, something so unreasonable that I have to exclude everything in my consciousness 
in order to even find it’ (PF, 46 /SKS 46, 251; translation modified). As Climacus suggests, the 
absolute paradox expresses something absolutely unknown that will always remain outside of the 
reach of the understanding. It cannot be fully conceptualized but can only become manifest as 
something absurd and ludicrous. Hence the reaction of the imaginary opponent is exactly the 
kind of reaction that Climacus is aiming for.  
Speaking in the voice of the religious poet, Climacus already showed that the god adopts 
the appearance of a servant. Now we have to find out how this is linked to the absolute paradox. 
Simply put, the absolute paradox can be summarized as follows: the god has become a human 
being, while also remaining the god; the eternal has become something historical, while also 
remaining eternal. One side of this absolute paradox—the divine and eternal—remains unknown. 
The other side—the human manifestation of the god—can be known immediately. That is why 
the god’s appearance as a servant is both an incognito and a true form. It is an incognito insofar 
as it is an indirect manifestation of the god who, despite this manifestation, ultimately remains 
the unknown. It is a true form insofar as it is a direct manifestation of the god’s willingness to 
lower himself in order to create a point of unity that bridges the gap between the human and the 
divine.  
The problem is: how can the individual get an intimation of the absolute paradox if one 
of its sides cannot be known in any way? It needs a kind of indirect communication that presents 
the unknown in some way or another without representing it as something that can be known 
after all. To conceptualize this type of indirect communication, Climacus introduces the noun 
Anstød, which can be translated either as ‘collision’ or as ‘offense.’ It introduces the idea of a 
collision with the unknown. This collision is an offense to the extent that the understanding 
cannot incorporate the unknown, but runs aground on it. The understanding encounters the 
unknown as a limit that can only be conceptualized in a negative way, i.e., as something ludicrous 
and absurd. By colliding with the paradox, human beings get so confused by what appears to 
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them as absurd that they no longer understand themselves. In this way, they are turned inward 
(the first step of education). In response, the understanding either rejects the seemingly absurd 
by taking offense or accepts it despite its improbable and unreasonable appearance (Climacus 
calls this faith).  
In the appendix to Chapter 3, ‘Offense at the paradox (an acoustic illusion),’ Climacus 
analyzes the counterintuitive causality that animates the Biblical conception of ‘a stone of 
stumbling’ or ‘a rock of offense.’11 To get a better grasp on this paradoxical causality, he equates 
the physical interaction between the stone/rock and the foot to the psychological interaction 
between the offensive one (who is giving offense) and the offended one (who is taking offense). 
Just as the rock causes the foot to stumble, so the offense that is given becomes the cause for the 
offense that is taken. At first sight it might seem that the understanding interprets the absolute 
paradox, judges it (‘this is absurd,’ ‘this is improbable’), and then takes offense. According to 
Climacus, however, this is an acoustic illusion. ‘While, therefore, the offense, however it 
expresses itself, sounds [lyder] from somewhere else—indeed, from the opposite corner—it is 
nevertheless the paradox, which echoes [gjenlyder] within it, and this indeed is an acoustic illusion’ 
(PF, 50-1/SKS 4, 255; translation modified). In relation to the paradox, the understanding is like 
the dummy of a ventriloquist. The offense seems to be invented by the understanding, but in 
fact it originated with the paradox. Its expressions are based on an acoustic illusion. As Climacus 
argues, the understanding does not articulate its own position, but simply parrots the paradox, 
‘just as someone carricaturing another does not invent anything, but only makes a distorted copy 
of someone else.’ (PF, 51/SKS 4, 254; translation modified). Instead of being a true invention, 
offense is merely a distorted copy of the unknown that is given by the paradox. In this sense, the 
understanding merely steals its ideas from the paradox. This already makes clear why Climacus 
relies on a poetic of self-incrimination. In relation to the paradox everybody is a thief. 
 
BETWEEN ATTACK AND DEFENSE 
As we have already seen several times, Climacus adopts the identity of a common thief and 
dialogizes his discourse by introducing an imaginary opponent who starts accusing him. 
Throughout the book, this imaginary opponent slowly grows into the role of a real interlocutor 
who engages with the arguments more fully. The by now familiar charge is repeated. ‘But 
someone may be saying, “Things are truly tiresome with you, for now we have the same story all 
over again; all the expressions you put into the mouth of the paradox do not belong to you at 
all”’ (PF, 53/SKS 4, 257; translation modified). Again Climacus is caught with stolen goods and 
accused of thievery, but a new charge is also added. He not only got the words from elsewhere, 
he also put them into the mouth of the paradox. Climacus admits that some of his expressions 
are indeed stolen from other authors. At the same time, he insists that these authors were not the 
true owners of the ideas they expressed, but that these ideas ultimately belong to the paradox. 
Climacus turns the accusation of the imaginary opponent on its head by suggesting that the 
second charge—that he has put the words of others into the mouth of the paradox—gives a 
completely wrong impression of what actually happened. In his view, it is the other way around. 
Climacus and all the authors he indirectly quotes literally took the words from the mouth of the 
paradox. Before anyone could articulate these words, the paradox had already expressed them. 
Anyone else who is saying them is only repeating what the paradox already expressed, regardless 
of whether these words were meant as an attack (‘that is just absurd’) or as a defense (‘because it 
is absurd’).  
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In the last two chapters of Philosophical Crumbs, the old charge of thievery is reiterated, but 
in a more subdued voice: ‘Once again, knowingly or unknowingly, you have mixed in some 
words that do not belong to you’ (PF, 68/SKS 4, 269; translation modified) and ‘you always mix 
in some little phrase that is not your own’ (PF, 105/SKS 4, 301). More importantly, the 
imaginary opponent’s accusatory mode of speaking now repeatedly transforms into its exact 
opposite. A laudatory mode of speaking that touches upon jealousy: ‘I already catch a glimpse of 
the ramified implications, even if it surprises me that I did not think of it myself and I would give 
a great deal to be the one who devised it’ (PF, 69/SKS 4, 270; translation modified). In a sense, 
the accusatory and the laudatory mode of speaking are equally problematic since both start from 
the assumption that it is important to mark who is the owner of the intellectual property that is 
on display, whereas the whole point is that these ideas cannot belong to anybody since they 
originate with the god. That is why Climacus has been showing throughout that he was not the 
one who invented it, but that he only knows it from the paradox. 
By employing these two modes of speaking—accusatory and laudatory—at once, 
Climacus again dialogizes his own discourse. Neither the accusatory mode that fits an attack on 
Christianity, nor the laudatory mode that matches its defense, is given a decisive impetus. 
Instead, both these responses are invoked at the same time. In a journal entry, Kierkegaard 
describes this strategy as follows: ‘Joh[annes] Cl[imacus] kept the matter dialectically at a point 
where no one could see directly whether it was an attack on Xnty or a defense, but that it 
depended on how things were with the reader, what he got out of the book’ (KJN 8, 113/ SKS 
24, 69).  In this way, Climacus assures that nothing resolute can be assigned to him as a separate 
instance of authority that hovers over the text and guards it, but that the reader becomes 
responsible for the stance that is taken.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The discourse of Philosophical Crumbs is constantly caught up in ambiguities. From the start, 
Climacus keeps insisting that he is only engaged in a hypothetical thought-project, the aim of 
which is to discover what it means to go further than Socrates. By presenting the orthodox views 
of Christianity as a hypothetical thought-project that he just invented, Climacus not only 
becomes a thief and a plagiarizer, but also remains an outsider who addresses an existential issue 
in a completely abstract way. At the same time, he highlights this contrast by emphasizing the 
existential nature of his thought-project and by incriminating himself. I have analyzed this 
rhetorical strategy as a poetics of self-incrimination. By adopting the identity of a thief, Climacus 
tries to replicate the incognito as a true form. To the extent that Climacus really turns out to be a 
thief, this adopted identity is his true form. To the extent that he tries to confront his readers 
with the paradoxical nature of a non-Socratic conception of truth, it is an incognito. The aim of 
this incognito is not to hide his own plagiarism, but to draw attention to the fact that going 
further than Socrates means that the truth needs to be stolen from somewhere else. This is the 
provocative logic of his thought-project: either we go back to Socrates or we incriminate 
ourselves and admit that we are thieves.  
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NOTES 																																																								
1 In the English-speaking world, the book came to be known as Philosophical Fragments or a Fragment of Philosophy. 
However, as Hannay remarks, ‘“Crumb” just is a closer translation of “Smule” than is “Fragment”’ (2009: xxxvii). 
Piety puts it even more strongly: ‘“fragments” is not among a dictionary’s favoured options for “Smuler,” and it 
guarantees that the nimble irony of that topsy-turvy title is lost’ (2009: xvi). The word ‘smule’ is often used in the 
sense of a small particle of bread. As such, it does not so much suggest incompleteness, but rather refers to 
By choosing the title Philosophical Fragments for their translation of Climacus’ book, the English translators 
accidently invoked the romantic genre of the fragment. Upon reading the book, the reader will soon discover that 
Climacus does not adopt this genre, but relies on another type of writing, which we now have to specify. Climacus 
uses two different terms to indicate this new genre: smule (crumb) and piece (insignificant written work; note; 
scribble). In a draft version the title page reads: ‘Philosophiske Piecer Smuler [Philosophical Scribbles Crumbs].’ 
(Tekstredegørelse SKS 4, 180). This indicates two things. First, the terms smule and piece refer to the same mode of 
writing. For that reason, I will take them as references to a single genre. Second, although the preface keeps referring 
to piecer rather than smuler, the change in the title suggests that Climacus ultimately prefers the latter over the former. 
That is why I will refer to this mode of writing as the genre of the crumb (den smule). What would this genre look like? 
To get a better grasp on this, let us first give a brief characterization of Romantic genre of the fragment from which it 
differs. 
There is no single definition of the genre of the fragment available. Each fragment defines the genre and at the 
same time displaces the definitions given by other fragments. The often-quoted Athenaeum fragment 53 indicates 
why this displacement is necessary: ‘For the mind it is just as fatal to have a system and not to have one: it simply 
has to take the decision to combine the two.’ (Schlegel 1991: 24; translation modified) Hence, the fragment is a 
discontinuous form that operates in the dialectical tension between creating a system and simultaneously displacing 
and dismantling it. In his article ‘The Athenaeum,’ Maurice Blanchot describes this as ‘the search for a new form of 
fulfillment that mobilizes – renders mobile – the whole even while interrupting it in various points.’ (Blanchot 1983: 
171) In his view, the fragments operate within a field that is constituted by all the other fragments to which it 
somehow relates, even though this relation cannot be understood in terms of a part-whole distinction. As Blanchot 
suggests, this field is determined by ‘the interval (a wait and a pause) that separates the fragments and that makes 
this separation the rhythmic principle of the work and its structure.’ (Ibid.: 172) Together, the fragments do not 
generate a unity, but open up ‘new relations that exempt themselves from unity, just as they exceed the whole.’ 
(Ibid.; translation modified) As such, the fragments generate an instable and discontinuous system that 
simultaneously organizes and disorganizes itself, made possible by its own intervals. 
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In contrast to the Romantic genre of the fragment, the new genre of the crumb that Climacus intrdocues does not 
aim to revolutionize the system from within by breaking it up in a dynamic system of seperated fragments. Instead, 
Climacus undermines his own position by denouncing any claim of authority and highlighting the insignificance of 
what is said. The aim of this self-deprecating rhetoric is not to make the character of the author appear more 
attractive through false modesty. On the contrary, Climacus actively tries to push readers away in order to force 
them to make a decision that discloses their own views. He relies here on the paradoxical causality that animates the 
Biblical conception of ‘a stone of stumbling’ or ‘a rock of offense’. Climacus not only discusses this paradoxical 
causality, but also tries to repeat its movement by highlighting the offensive nature of Christianity.  
2 This play is continued in the rather elaborate Postscript to the Philosophical Crumbs that is also attributed to the 
pseudonym Climacus.  
3 After a long, unauthorized absence the jester Feste is (playfully) confronted by Maria, a gentlewoman in Lady 
Olivia’s household: ‘My lady will hang thee for thy absence.’ In response, Feste jests about the invoked punishment 
and states, among other things: ‘Many a good hanging prevents a bad marriage’ (2003: 70). Kierkegaard used the 
German translation by Schlegel and Tieck and translated it into Danish as ‘Bedre godt hængt end slet gift’ (SKS 4, 
214). 
4 The notion ‘going further’ echoes Hegel’s speculative vocabulary. It is used in an ironic way and marks a break 
with the Socratic viewpoint, without presenting this break as a progression in the speculative sense.  
5 I have at various points modified the Hong & Hong translation. This does not signify that I take issue with their 
translation; it simply is a way to get a better sense of the language Kierkegaard used.  
6 Socrates states at the beginning of the Meno: ‘I myself, Meno, am as poor as my fellow citizens in this matter, and I 
blame myself for my complete ignorance about virtue’ (Plato 1997: 871/71b). A bit further on he adds: ‘I have never 
yet met anyone else who did know [what virtue is]’ (Ibid., 872/71c). 
7 Early on, Meno defines virtue as the ability ‘to rule over [archein] people’ (Plato 1997: 873/73d). In response, 
Socrates immediately starts to complicate the issue: ‘is virtue the same in the case of a child or a slave, namely, for 
them to be able to rule over [archein] a master [despotou], and do you think that he who rules [archon] is still a slave?’ 
(Ibid.). Throughout the dialogue, there are several ironic references to Meno as the one who directs and rules 
Socrates: ‘Because you are forever giving orders in a discussion, as spoiled people do, who behave like tyrants as 
long as they are young. And perhaps you have recognized that I am at a disadvantage with handsome people, so I 
will do you the favor of an answer’ (Plato 1997: 876/76b-c). And: ‘If I were ruling over [arkho] you, Meno, and not 
only over myself, we would not have investigated whether virtue is teachable or not before we had investigated what 
virtue itself is. Over yourself you do not even attempt to rule [archein] (in order to remain free), but over me you 
attempt to rule [archein] and you actually rule [archeis], for that reason I will concede to you—for what can I do?’ 
(Plato 1997: 887/86d, translation modified). 
8 Socrates’ phrasing is obviously ironic. The aim is not to present the actual inquiry, but to identify the slave with 
Meno. The latter said earlier in the dialogue: ‘I have made many speeches about virtue before large audiences on a thousand 
occasions, very good speeches as I thought, but now I cannot even say what it is. I think you are wise not to sail 
away from Athens to go and stay elsewhere, for if you were to behave like this as a stranger in another city, you 
would be driven away for practicing sorcery’ (Plato 1997: 879/80b). Note that Meno admits his perplexity, but 
blames it on Socrates’ sorcery rather than on his own lack of knowledge.  
9 In Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, Mikhail Bakhtin introduces the notion ἀνάκρισις (anacrisis), an ancient Greek 
juridical term, to describe a rhetorical technique that is employed here. ‘Anacrisis was understood as a means for 
eliciting and provoking the words of one’s interlocutor, forcing him to express his opinion and express it 
thoroughly.’ Unfortunately, Bakthin does not offer any evidence to support this interpretation of anacrisis. It comes 
from ana, ‘up’ and krino, ‘closely examining’ and refers, to a legal procedure that involves questioning of some kind. 
As Harrison indicates, however, it is ‘much more difficult to define precisely what the aim of this questioning might 
be’ (1971: 95). A possible source for Bakhtin might have been an archaic law that is described by Demosthenes in 
Against Stephanus II: ‘The two parties to a suit shall be compelled to answer one another’s questions’ (1939: 251). 
According to Lämmli this law indicates that ‘the anacrisis gave litigants some chance of seeing into their opponents’ 
cards; for they could put questions to them which the opponents had to answer, though they were not forced to 
furnish evidence on the points raised.’ (Summarized in Harrison 1971: 98, footnote 2). Despite the rather scanty 
evidence that anacrisis was indeed what Bakthin takes it to be, his idiosyncratic understanding of the term provides a 
good basis for understanding the underlying rhetorical structure of the maieutic incognito. 
10 There is a thinly disguised reference here to Kierkegaard’s engagement with Regine Olsen. In his Journals and 
Notebooks Kierkegaard often explicitly refers to his own incognito (e.g. KJN 4: 256; 5: 259-60, 287; 6: 75, 237; 7: 129, 
213, 236; 8: 297). In relation to Regine, these references remain more hidden. 
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11 The locus classicus for the Biblical conception of offense can be found in Isaiah 8: 14. Two notions are 
introduced here: eben negeph (a stone the makes the foot trip) and tsuwr mikshowl (a rock that becomes a cause to fall). 
In the Greek New Testament, the words from Isaiah are quoted in Greek translation, for instance in 1 Peter 2:8. 
The stone becomes a lithos proskommatos (a stone of stumbling), derived from proskopto: to strike against. The rock 
becomes a petra skandalou (a rock of offense).  
